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Abstract:  
Purposes: To assess the relationship between hospitals’ X-inefficiency levels and overall care quality 
based on the National Quality Forum’s 30 safe practices score and to improve the analytic strategy for 
assessing X-inefficiency.  
Methodology: The 2005 versions of the American Hospital Association and Leapfrog Group’s annual 
surveys were the basis of the study. Additional case mix indices and market variables were drawn 
from the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services data sources and the Area Resource File. Data 
envelopment analysis was used to determine hospitals’ X-inefficiency scores relative to their market-
level competitors. Regression was used to assess the relationship between X-inefficiency and quality, 
controlling for organizational and market characteristics. Expenses (total and labor expenditures), 
case-mix-adjusted admissions, length of stay, and licensed beds defined the X-inefficiency function. 
The overall National Quality Forum’s safe practice score, health maintenance organization 
penetration, market share, and teaching status served as independent control variables in the 
regression.  
Findings: The National Quality Forum’s safe practice scores are significantly and positively 
correlated to hospital X-inefficiency levels (β = .105, p ≤ .05). The analysis of the value proposition 
had very good explanatory power (adjusted R
2
 = .414; p ≤ .001; df = 7,265). Contrary to earlier 
findings, health maintenance organization penetration and being a teaching hospital were positively 
related to X-inefficiency. Similar with others’ findings, greater market share and for-profit ownership 
were negatively associated with X-inefficiency. 
Practice Implications: Measurement of overall hospital quality is improving but can still be made 
better. Nevertheless, the National Quality Forum’s measure is significantly related to efficiency and 
could be used to create differential pay-for-performance programs. A market-segmented analytic 
strategy for studying hospital’s efficiency yields results with a high degree of explanatory power. 
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Article: 
The quality and efficiency of the U.S. health care system are not what it should be. Hospitals, in 
particular, have been criticized as having inconsistent quality control processes that have led to 
increased lengths of stay, additional charges due to preventable errors, and excess mortality (Zhan & 
Miller, 2003). In other words, poor quality of care creates system-wide inefficiencies. Further, these 
inefficiencies are contributing to the above-average health care inflation that is endemic in the U.S. 
system when compared with that in other industrialized nations. Therefore, striving for better quality 
of care processes within hospitals should be systematically and positively related to greater efficiency 
gains within facilities. 
 
Despite the intuitive appeal that better quality and increased efficiency should move together, it has 
been difficult to empirically demonstrate the ―value proposition‖ at the institutional level in health 
care. Large-scale systematic efforts that comparatively assess hospitals’ overall quality are in their 
early stages. The National Quality Forum (NQF) and the Hospital Quality Alliance both sponsor 
programs to assess hospitals’ performance that were initiated in 2003 (Morrissey, 2003; Ward, Evans, 
Spies, Roberts, & Wakefield, 2006) and 2004 (Jha, Li, Orav, & Epstein, 2005), respectively. Hospital 
cost efficiency, on the other hand, has been extensively studied, as have the organizational and market 
factors that influence performance (e.g., Carey, 2003; Chirikos, 1999; McKay, Deily, & Dorner, 2003; 
Rosko, 2004). Researchers have begun to look at the quality–cost relationship (e.g., Jiang, Friedman, 
& Begun, 2006); however, there have been no large-scale studies using the newly developed hospital 
metrics that examine the value proposition that quality and efficiency are positively related. 
 
The purpose of this study is to test the hospitals’ value proposition. In particular, the relationship 
between the hospitals’ relative X-inefficiency within their markets and its relationship to quality using 
the NQF’s safe practices standards are explored. A two-stage approach was used in the analysis 
(Rosko & Chilingerian, 1999). In the first stage, a data envelopment analysis (DEA) to determine the 
cost function was estimated for 273 hospitals in the 19 largest consolidated metropolitan statistical 
areas (CMSAs). Unlike earlier studies (e.g., Carey, 2003; Rosko, 2001a, 2004), the DEA was 
performed on a market-by-market basis (i.e., 19 separate DEAs were run) rather than by combining 
the entire sample and then controlling market characteristics. In the second stage, the estimated 
inefficiency scores were used as dependent variables to assess their relationship with the NQF’s safe 
practices scores, organizational characteristics (e.g., system type, teaching programs, and ownership), 
and external market pressures (e.g., health maintenance organization [HMO] penetration and hospital 
market share). 
 
Establishing the relationship between hospital efficiency and quality metrics is of critical interest to 
health services researchers, purchasers, and policy-makers seeking to improve the U.S. health care 
system’s effectiveness while simultaneously controlling costs— collectively increasing value. The 
Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services’ (CMS’) policy goals were recently highlighted by the 
Secretary of Health, Michael Leavitt, who stressed the importance of a value-driven reform plan, 
which provides better quality at lower cost (Manos, 2008). Although improving either quality or cost 
independently may increase the overall value, the current belief among many purchasers, including the 
federal government, is that inefficiency is the result of poor quality. In the same speech, Secretary 
Leavitt emphasized the need for standardized quality metrics that are available to consumers. 
 
Assessing one of the recently developed quality metric’s statistical powers with a large-scale sample 
of hospitals is an important step in improving measurement science. In addition, the hierarchical 
market-level approach to DEA increases the congruence between research methods and the standard 
economic theory on the function of markets. Further, DEA creates a more parsimonious analysis by 
reducing the need for market-level control variables. From the perspective of both purchasers and 
policymakers’ perspectives, the analysis explores the reliability of the hospital quality and cost 
information that some pay-for-performance programs are using as basis for designing health benefit 
plans. 
 
The article begins with a brief review of the hospital quality assessment movement. Next, the sample 
description and analytic strategies are described followed by the results. A discussion of the major 
findings is offered. Lastly, the conclusions, limitations, and areas of future research are provided. 
 
Conceptual Framework  
The hospital value proposition is predicated on the belief that poor care quality leads to higher costs 
because patients require additional treatment to address failures in the delivery of the standard of care 
or, in the worst case, remediate medical errors that have caused additional harm. In other words, poor 
quality of care leads to less efficient use of health care resources. The increasing health care 
expenditures in the United States, coupled with quality concerns, have stimulated several 
contemporary trends focused on the value proposition (Clancy, 2004). Most of the nationwide efforts 
have increased the amount, validity, and availability of the clinical process and outcome information 
as key starting points for their improvement programs (Marshall, Shekelle, Leatherman, & Brook, 
2000). The underlying belief is that more information will prompt consumers and purchasers to shift 
their consumption patterns to better rated providers and facilities (Ford & Scanlon, 2007). 
 
With respect to hospitals, there are two major quality information initiatives. The two initiatives are 
closely linked, and there are ongoing efforts to harmonize these measures. One is the Hospital Quality 
Alliance’s initiative launched in 2003 by a consortium of organizations, including CMS, the Joint 
Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations, and the American Hospital Association 
(AHA; Jha et al., 2005). The other, and the focus of this study, is the NQF’s Safe Practices for Better 
Healthcare: A Consensus Report (Road-map for safety: National Quality Forum officially releases 30 
safe practices for better healthcare, 2003). 
 
The NQF’s safe practices have been incorporated into the Leapfrog Group’s annual survey of 
hospitals. Leapfrog’s goal is to ―encourage health providers to publicly report their clinical care 
processes so that consumers and purchasing organizations can make informed health care choices‖ 
(Leapfrog Group home-page, 2007). Therefore, the measures are being collected using a nationwide 
survey targeting the most active health care markets. However, quality is only half of the value 
proposition. 
 
Value is inherently a relative assessment of one organization’s quality and efficiency compared with 
other choices in the market place. Therefore, some component of the value function must reside at the 
market level. Local labor and supply costs in particular tend to be market driven. The movement to 
improve the health care system has determined that quality should be assessed using comparable 
metrics so facilities can be compared on a national basis. The underlying logic is that there are 
evidence-based standards of care regardless of where services are delivered—hence national standards. 
 
Efficiency, on the other hand, has a significant local component determined by prevailing market 
conditions, such as wages, insurance contracting (HMO penetration), and competition. Because 
different regions of the country have significantly different market input prices for labor and supplies, 
the Medicare program adjusts the prices it pays providers to reflect what ―efficient providers would 
incur for furnishing high quality care‖ (Adjusting Medicare payments for local market input prices: 
Statement before the U.S. House of Representatives, 2002). However, quality and input costs are not 
the only factors that impact an organization’s potential efficiency vis-á-vis other hospitals in the 
market. 
 
Both organizational features and market structures will impact what determines optimal efficiency. At 
the institutional level, characteristics such as ownership structure (e.g., community, nonprofit, or for 
profit), market share, and the presence of residency or other educational programs will effect how 
hospitals pursue their mission. At the market level, greater competition and the level of HMO activity 
have both been found to increase efficiency (Rosko & Chilingerian, 1999; Rosko & Mutter, 2008). 
Further, different regions have different levels of medical education. To the extent that medical 
education programs provide a subsidized source of labor, they too will influence a region’s efficiency 
compared with other parts of the country. 
 
The measurement of hospital X-inefficiency has a longer history than that of the health care quality 
movement. However, there is still debate about the best analytic strategy to employ in calculating the 
X-inefficiency measure (Newhouse, 1994). Both DEA and stochastic methodologies have been widely 
used, but there is clearly room for methodological improvements and innovations that allow 
researchers to select from a range of analytic strategies to find the one best suited to their questions 
and data (Rosko & Mutter, 2008). 
 
Methods  
This article extends the methodologies of earlier studies of system hospital performance by evaluating 
hospitals’ ―technical‖ efficiency using DEA at the market level. Typical analyses of cost data 
(Coverdale, Gibbs, & Nurse, 1980; Poverejan, Gardiner, Bradley, Holmes-Rovner, & Rovner, 2003; 
Regier, Sunderji, Lynd, Gin, & Marra, 2006) often build cost functions using regression analysis, 
which seeks to identify a line of best fit for a data set. Rather than identifying the line which best 
represents the relationship between two variables, DEA is a data-intensive analytic method, which 
seeks to identify the ―leading edge‖ on which the most efficient organizations balance both input and 
outputs. 
 
Data envelopment analysis is one of a number of nonparametric methods used to measure the relative 
technical efficiency of a homogenous number of organizations that essentially perform the same tasks 
(Sanhueza, Rudnick, & Lagunas, 2004). Within that context, organizations that reside off the cost 
frontier may suffer from excess input allocations (technical inefficiency) or from incorrect 
combinations of inputs (allocative inefficiency). It is necessary to have input cost data to accurately 
assess ―allocative‖ efficiency; input costs are determined at the market level. Therefore, a different 
market’s prevailing input costs will lead to different optimal allocation strategies in each market. By 
analyzing technical efficiency at the market level, one of the factors that determine allocative 
efficiency, market pricing of inputs, is controlled for—albeit indirectly. 
 
This research specifically extends the efforts made by Carey (2003) to study similar factors in similar 
contexts. In that work, Carey draws on stochastic frontier analysis (SFA) rather than on DEA to 
identify the efficiency frontier. The argument for SFA as a frontier model is compelling—―DEA has a 
critical shortcoming in that it ignores the possibility that the observations in the data may be subject to 
random fluctuations‖ (Carey, 2003, p. 29). SFA is an extension of regression analysis made under the 
assumption that the residual from the simple regression approach can be decomposed into two 
factors—statistical error and inefficiency. Inefficiency is assumed to be a nonnegative value and 
follow a particular statistical distribution (e.g., half-normal) based on the assumption that an 
organization of business unit demonstrating zero inefficiency resides on the cost frontier. SFA can be 
used to assess allocative efficiency if input price data are available. DEA, in contrast, does not require 
input price data; however, it assumes no measurement error. Therefore, DEA is limited to the 
estimation of technical efficiency using inputs that are not priced, whereas SFA can be used to assess 
allocative efficiency. Both are necessary to measure cost inefficiency. 
 
Knowing the prevailing price of an input is critical to understanding allocative efficiency because 
managers will seek to substitute high cost inputs with complementary inputs of a lower price to 
optimize allocative efficiency. Because prices are determined in the local market, in the absence of 
such information, it is difficult to compare organizations from different markets. Our approach here 
was to use a market-segmented DEA, which allows the identification of technical efficiency frontiers 
within markets and results in both a more context-specific application of DEA and the calculation of 
slack resources in each market. We believe that this is a more appropriate analytical approach, in part, 
because it inherently controls for the input costs common to facilities in the same market. Said 
differently, although a hospital in Newark may be underutilized, it ought to not simply accept the 
overutilization of hospitals in Miami as a standard determination of overall efficiency. Arguably, then, 
it would seem more appropriate and locally relevant for determinations of any type of efficiency to 
take place within local contexts rather than against global ones. Using DEA, we identify the data 
frontier technical inefficiency (X-inefficiency) function: 
 
C = f(w,X) 
 
as subject to both input and outputs, where C is the total cost, w is the input price, and X is a vector of 
outputs and other factors that affect cost. Our DEA was conducted using DEAP 2.1, a program 
published by The Centre for Efficiency and Productivity Analysis. Subsequent analysis was conducted 
using SPSS 15.0. 
 
We drew on four data sets for our analyses. The first data set was the fiscal year 2005 edition of the 
AHA’s annual survey. Those data were augmented with the Leapfrog Group’s annual survey from the 
same year. The Leapfrog data contained the NQF’s safe practices metric. The Area Resource File 
provided the Medicare HMO penetration rate and the CMSA variables for 2005. The case mix index 
(CMI) for 2005 was drawn from publicly available files. All of the data sets used the AHA’s 
identification number for merging the files. 
 
We began our analysis by drawing on Carey’s (2003) input–output model for defining the components 
of efficiency when drawing on the AHA data set. In Carey’s article, the average annual salary and 
number of beds for each hospital were used as inputs, and the adjusted admissions and adjusted patient 
days were used as outputs. The Medicare diagnosis-related group inpatient CMI was used to adjust the 
admissions to control for differences in acuity across facilities. 
 
We took a slightly different approach in that we submit that CMI is, in fact, an input variable by 
viewing hospitals as organizations that take patients with various health problems and process them 
through the health care system. This perspective would then necessitate that the complexity of the 
cases coming to the organization is an input rather than an output. Further, because we used a market-
level approach, we no longer needed to make wage adjustments to account for local factors because 
our analysis was inherently local. As a result, we define the inputs of hospitals by the money invested 
in the people and facilities (total facility expenditures), the number of beds available at the facility (a 
measure of capacity), and a metric reflecting the clinical complexity of the patient population 
admitted—measured using the CMI. In terms of outputs, we argue that adjusted patient days (adjusted 
patient days of care take into account the outpatient care provided by the hospital because staffing 
level data do not distinguish between inpatient and outpatient staffing) and number of admissions are 
appropriate output measures. Both measures are indicative of organizational throughput. The former 
establishes a metric related to revenue for the organization, whereas the latter measures not only input 
but also output under the expectation that individuals admitted are discharged as well. 
 
Taking a market-level analysis as the first step is in sharp contrast with previous studies (cf. Chirikos, 
1999; McKay et al., 2003; Rosko & Chilingerian, 1999; Zuckerman, Hadley, & Iezzoni, 1994). In the 
calculation of the market-level efficiency, every hospital that provided complete input and output 
variables to the AHA was included, rather than reducing the data set to the Leapfrog respondents. In 
doing so, a more robust estimate of the relative market efficiency of each hospital can be ascertained 
prior to doing the second step of the analysis. Nineteen markets were used. Markets ranged in size 
from having 19 (Sacramento) to 241 (New York) hospitals, with a mean number of 47.3 hospitals per 
market. Altogether, 899 facilities were included in the initial DEA used to create the X-inefficiency 
measure. 
 
For the second stage of the analysis, it was necessary for the hospital to have responded to the 
Leapfrog Group’s annual survey to have a NQF’s safe practices score. Altogether, 273 hospitals in the 
19 targeted markets responded to the survey, provided information on every other variable of interest, 
and were used in the regression analysis. The safe practices composite score measure was skewed 
toward reported full compliance. Therefore, the variable was recoded into quintiles, with the value 1 
being the lowest attaining group of hospitals and 5 being the highest classification. 
Several additional structural variables were drawn from the AHA data set. A for-profit ownership 
control dummy variable is included to explore the public– private structures’ impact on efficiency. 
Finally, we have followed past practice by including membership in the Council of Teaching Hospitals 
of the Association of American Medical Colleges (COTH). Data were also gathered on environmental 
variables included in the model. Market share was calculated from AHA data based on the percentage 
of total admissions within a geographic domain—often CMSAs, but where a hospital was not within a 
CMSA, markets were defined by county. Medicare HMO penetration rate was taken from the Area 
Resource File data set. The Herfindahl measure was calculated using admission counts from the AHA 
data set. Summing the number of COTH facilities in a market and dividing it by the total number 
facilities was used to calculate the amount of medical education in the market. 
 
Findings  
Analysis on the dependent variable X-inefficiency (technical efficiency) was determined through 
regression along the seven independent variables (four institutional level and three market level). For 
all but two independent variable, the relationships were determined to be significant at p > .01. The 
NQF’s safe practice score was significant at p :5 .05, and the COTH–market variable was not 
significant at the levels typically used by health services researchers. The means and correlations for 
all variables are displayed in Table 1. 
 
With the exception of market share and ownership control code, the independent variables were 
positively correlated to the dependent variable (see Table 2). In the case of market share, the results 
are open to two possible interpretations. One explanation is that diseconomies of scale are making 
facilities less technically efficient. A second explanation is that as competition within a market 
decreases and organizations hold a greater amount of market share, efficiency suffers. The two options 
are not mutually exclusive, and both factors may play a role. The market-level measure of 
competition’s positive coefficients (Herfindahl) supports the contention that markets with multiple 
competitors result in greater efficiency across the market as a whole. We also note that governance for 
each hospital affects efficiency. The analysis indicates that being a for-profit institution has a 
significant and negative impact on efficiency, supporting the contention that publicly run and 
nonprofit hospitals are, on average, more efficient than privately run hospitals. This finding runs 
counter to common perception that private production of services results in a generally more efficient 
than nonprofit production. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Facilities that served as teaching hospitals (member of the COTH) were systematically more efficient 
than their counterparts without such programs. The presence of medical residents may represent a 
relatively low-cost complement for other types of clinicians and a concomitant increase in efficiency. 
The market-level assessment of the presence of teaching hospitals was not significantly related to the 
technical efficiency variable. Taking the two variables’ results together, it does not appear that having 
a large medical education sector in a market is systematically related to increased efficiency. 
 
The overall model was robust (adjusted R = .414), and overall model was found to be significant at p < 
.001. Because the most conservative of all possible observation inclusion strategies was used, the total 
observed values for which all required full data resulted in a reduction in the number of cases to 273 
(applying a ―list-wise deletion‖ criterion). As noted earlier, the efficiency was calculated on a much 
larger set, resulting in a more robust calculation of the dependent variable (viz, X-inefficiency). 
 
Discussion  
The two major aims of this study were to assess the value proposition that better quality is 
systematically related to greater efficiency and that using a market-level analytic methodology was an 
effective strategy. Both aims were achieved with positive results. Further, the additional control 
variables’ significance levels and relational direction provide valuable insights into both the safe 
practice measure’s utility and the analytic approaches’ performance. Each aim and the implications of 
the control variables’ performance are discussed in turn. 
 
National Quality Forum’s Safe Practices Measure and Hospital Efficiency 
Purchasers and policymakers have placed a great deal of emphasis on the link between quality and 
efficiency. Further, both groups have asserted that the health care payment system as it is currently 
structured rewards low quality in the form of additional payments to remediate errors. Therefore, the 
logic model these constituencies are operating on states that creating greater efficiency is dependent 
upon improving the quality of care provided. 
 
Both CMS and private insurers are actively developing and implementing incentive and reward 
programs to gain better value from their investments in health care services. CMS in particular is 
taking the lead in the movement to link pay to performance. To that end, Medicare will stop 
reimbursing hospitals for treating eight ―reasonably preventable‖ conditions acquired in the facilities 
in 2008 (Zhang, 2007). 
 
Addressing quality on case-by-case basis is an important component of the larger movement; however, 
it will not be enough in and of itself to generate the increased value purchasers, and consumers need to 
en-joy the level of care coverage they currently enjoy into the future. Further, targeting particular 
clinical conditions will not address the culture, leadership, and education issues in hospitals that have 
been the biggest barriers to quality and cost improvement programs (Blake, Kohler, Rask, Davis, & 
Naylor, 2006; Rask et al., 2007). Therefore, having both service-specific and holistic measures of 
hospitals’ quality will allow for multipronged pay-for-performance programs that will accelerate the 
rate of positive change in the U.S. health care system. The analysis conducted herein can be ex-tended 
to explore the performance of particular markets and be used to modify payments to hospitals. For 
example, CMS could modify its Prospective Payment System’s market-level adjustments to reduce 
payments to inefficient markets or lower quality. 
 
The NQF’s safe practices measures can serve the dual purposes of informing and evaluating hospitals 
performance based on the results of this analysis and others that have linked the scores to morbidity 
outcomes (Jha, Orav, Li, & Epstein, 2007). However, most of the facilities performed well on the 
NQF’s safe practices measures as they are currently configured, thus reducing their discriminatory 
power. The collaboration managing the NQF program plans to increase the number of measures being 
used over time to address this limitation. The dynamic nature of the NQF and its collaboration with 
other major stakeholders, CMS in particular, ensure that the safe practices measures will be improved 
over time and be gathered on a regular basis. Therefore, the NQF’s safe practices movement represents 
a major evolutionary step in the patient safety and quality arena but would benefit from further study 
in relationship to market and organizational characteristics. 
 
Market and Organizational Factors 
Three of the independent control variables—Herfindahl, HMO penetration rate, and having teaching 
hospital status—were significant and perform as expected in relationship to the X-inefficiency 
measure. Economic theory posits that greater competition will lead to greater organizational 
efficiency; therefore, a positive coefficient on the Herfindahl measure is consistent with that lemma. 
Previous research has generally found that in-creased HMO penetration rates are related to lower 
hospital cost inflation and utilization rates (Gaskin & Hadley, 1997; Mukamel, Zwanziger, & 
Tomaszewski, 2001; Robinson, 1991; Rosko, 2001b). There are fewer studies of teaching hospitals’ 
X-inefficiency relative to other types of facilities, but given the significant amount of additional 
staffing at relatively low wages, it stands to reason that they should compare favorably (Rosko, 2004). 
 
Two of the independent variables did not perform as expected—market share and ownership control. 
Generally, it is assumed that increased volume will lead to increased operational efficiency in the form 
of economies of scale (Fulton, Lasdon, & McDaniel, 2007). However, Tucker and Edmondson (2003) 
showed that in large hospitals communication and coordination within and across functional teams are 
very challenging and are prone to errors and service failures. Moreover, such systemic errors are 
persistent in the sense that workers do not learn from past failures. There may be significant 
diseconomies of scale or scope associated with hospital operations that lead to lower quality and, in 
turn, less efficient operations. Therefore, these findings warrant further investigation to tease out the 
volume–quality–efficiency connections. 
 
Although the ownership control variable did not perform as expected, general economic and agency 
theories contend that market forces and executive reward systems will lead for-profit organizations to 
operate in a more efficient manner (Anheier & Benner, 2003). There are two possible explanations for 
the counterintuitive results. The first is a statistical issue. The AHA taxonomy has most of the for-
profit systems classified into one cluster. This may result in some confounding of the variables. An 
alternative explanation is that the organizational slack in nonprofit firms is so scarce that it is not 
possible for the leaders to operate inefficiently. 
 
Practice Implications  
As discussed herein, major initiatives are underway to both improve hospital quality metrics and 
release those results to external stakeholders. For health care practitioners, there will likely be a greater 
importance placed on performance with respect to quality outcomes (e.g., the NQF’s safe practices 
scores, the Leapfrog Group, and other outlets) by both consumers and purchasers. This study 
empirically demonstrates to practitioners that the hospital value proposition holds, specifically with 
reference to the positive relationship between quality metrics and hospital efficiency. Efforts to 
improve quality and effectiveness while simultaneously working to reduce costs (and increase 
efficiencies) do not represent the zero-sum game. Practitioners facing increasing pressures to 
maximize value will be encouraged by this outcome. 
 
The use of DEA technique can be used at the hospital or system level, with disparate units and 
outcomes using a similar methodology. Practitioners can use the tools to both compare performance 
across units and develop appropriate metrics for unit managers to apply during shifts. Given a set of 
inputs and specific outputs, efficiency frontiers can be developed for any number of outcomes, proving 
an opportunity for competitive advantage. Practitioners can use this knowledge to evaluate their own 
market, relative to their competitors, to increase profits or improve patients’ perceptions of quality. 
 
Conclusions  
This analysis supports the relationship between efficiency and other expected factors, including 
quality, which serve to make the value proposition that policy-makers and purchasers are relying upon 
more tangible. As hospitals, and their policy oversight bodies, struggle with the challenges of quality 
and cost, the relationships between these variables must be explored in much greater detail. This 
analysis represents one of a number in the literature seeking to explore that dynamic, but unlike others, 
the value of taking a local perspective is shown to increase the explanatory power of the analysis. As 
the quality of data collection efforts increases and a universal expectation of reporting quality takes 
hold among hospital, we will see more studies of this kind in the literature. We have shown that using 
a market-by-market DEA has significant explanatory power in relationship to both institutional-level 
and market-level variables of interest—including the summated quality scores being promulgated by 
the NQF. 
 
Limitations and Future Research 
There are two main limitations to the current study. First, the findings from this study cannot be 
generalized to all U.S. hospitals because of the purposeful sampling frame that targeted large markets. 
In particular, urban versus rural location and differences in hospital size may lead to systematic 
resource constraints in small rural facilities and play an important role in both quality and efficiency. 
However, a study of the same NQF’s safe practices by Rask et al. (2007) found no significant 
differences based on those dimensions. 
 
The second major limitation is response bias in two forms. Better performing hospitals may view 
participating in the Leapfrog Group’s survey as a means for capitalizing on a competitive advantage 
associated with their quality. The second form of response bias arises from the self-reporting feature of 
the surveying methodology used. Some hospitals may overstate the degree to which they have 
implemented the NQF’s safe practices. The two forms of bias, to the extent they exist, both serve to 
diminish the statistical power of the regression analysis. 
 
Nevertheless, this study was able to achieve significant explanatory power even with the potential 
biases. In future studies, higher response rates (that are essentially being mandated by CMS) and more 
objectively assessed measures of quality will increase the reliability and validity of research using 
similar approaches. 
 
The CMS’s efforts to systematically collect cost and quality data similar, and more granular, with that 
used in this study will make more rigorous analytic strategies possible. The more granular nature of 
the data will allow for detailed examination of the disease- and treatment-specific aspect of the health 
care system (e.g., Jha et al., 2005). Such future studies will be able to make significant contributions to 
the evidence-based medicine movement (Fonarow et al., 2007). Longitudinal studies of that data will 
allow researchers to study the cause-and-effect relationship between quality and efficiency. The use of 
CMSA markets as a unit of analysis is a natural component of such a study using hierarchical linear 
models over time. 
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